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Abstract: Franz Kafka’s (1883-1924) “Die Brücke” is one of the less well-known texts by one of 
the most prolific authors of literary modernity. However, this short prose text embodies prevalent 
questions of literary modernity and philosophy as it reflects the crisis of language in regard of 
identity, communication, and literary production. Placed in the context of fin-de-siècle’s 
discourse of language crisis, this article provides a dialogue between Kafka’s “Die Brücke” and 
Hannah Arendt’s (1906-1975) philosophy of thinking and speaking in The Life of the Mind. 
Contrary to Arendt’s understanding of the metaphor as “a carrying over” between the mental 
activities of the solitude thinker and a reconciliation with the pluralistic world shared with others, 
this article argues for a deconstructionist reading of “Die Brücke” as a tool to reevaluate Arendt’s 
notion of a shared human experience ensured through language and illustrates the advantages of 
poetic texts within philosophical discourses. 
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Zusammenfassung: “Die Brücke” von Franz Kafka (1883-1934) ist einer der weniger beachteten 
poetischen Texte des Autors. Dieser Artikel argumentiert für die Relevanz dieses Prosastückes 
innerhalb des Diskurses der literarischen Moderne und der Philosophie hinsichtlich von Fragen 
nach Identitäts- und Sprachkrise und der Möglichkeit von literarischer Produktion. Indem ein 
Dialog zwischen Kafkas poetischem Text und Hannah Arendts (1906-1975) Philosophie des 
Denkens und des Sprechens in The Life of the Mind hergestellt wird, zeigt dieser Artikel wie 
Kafkas “Brücke” Arendts Verständnis einer Verbindung zwischen der geistigen Welt und der 
Welt als pluralistischen Ort, den wir mit anderen Menschen teilen, dekonstuiert und folglich auch 
die Annahme menschlicher Grunderfahrungen und ihrer Mitteilbarkeit in Frage stellt. Damit 
thematisiert dieser Artikel auch die Vorteile poetischer Texte innerhalb des philosophischen 
Diskurses.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Hannah Arendt’s philosophy on language and thinking is in stark contrast with Franz 
Kafka’s fictional prose text “Die Brücke” (1916/1917), which concerns itself with the 
same subject matter of bridging an abyss. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt depicts how 
thinking manifests itself through speech. The urge to speak, Arendt explains, is a sign for 
the quest of meaning; a process during which the thinking ego seeks to attest his or her 
mental activities both to the world of appearances and to him- or herself. While we 
withdraw from the world of appearances into the realm of concepts and abstractions 
during the act of thinking, our common sense and our belonging to the sensory world 
requires examples to illustrate abstract concepts. “At this point,” ARENDT (1971: 103) 
continues, “metaphor comes in. The metaphor achieves the ‘carrying over’ […] the 
transition from one existential state, that of thinking, to another, that of being an 
appearance among appearances, and this can only be done by analogies.”  
 Kafka’s “Brücke,” however, presents the reader with traffic between the sensory 
and the non-sensory world that is marked with failure and ultimately leads to violence 
and destruction. Kafka’s bridge, which is also the narrator of the story, collapses in the 
very moment a wanderer approaches it for the first time — a moment for which the 
bridge desperately has been waiting. Despite the bridge’s best intention to hold up the 
traveler entrusted to it (“halte den dir Anvertrauten”), it is terrified by an abrupt and 
forceful leap the wanderer undertakes on its back (1969: 327). Struck by the sudden pain 
the bridge has not anticipated, it turns around to see who inflicted such pain on it and 
despite the realization of its mistake — “Brücke dreht sich um!” — falls into the abyss 
and is pierced by the once peacefully stones “die mich immer so friedlich aus dem 
rasenden Wasser angestarrt hatten” (1969: 327).  
 Contrary to ARENDT’S (1971: 105) elated account, in which the metaphor is 
“bridging the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of 
appearances,” and thus can be seen as “the greatest gift language could bestow on 
thinking”, Kafka’s text paints a bleaker picture. For ARENDT (1971: 110), metaphorical 
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language — itself metaphorically illustrated as a bridge — not only makes the 
transcendence between the sensory world and the non-sensory world possible, but also 
abolishes this difference altogether: “There are no two worlds because metaphor unites 
them.”. Opposed to this logic, Kafka’s “Brücke” creates an image of writing as alienation 
and embodies the experience of “what it means to be outside of everything, even outside 
of oneself” (MILLER 1991: 19).  
This article provides a deconstructionist reading of Kafka’s text. Referring to 
deconstructionist criticism and its representatives like Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and 
J. Hillis Miller, it illustrates how the story deconstructs its own writing process in its 
impossibility to transcend the abyss between the world of appearances and the 
metaphysical realm, the signified and the signifier, origin and presence, and subject and 
object. Kafka’s text is then placed within the context of the language skepticism of fin-
de-siècle’s modernity to reevaluate Arendt’s notion of language — and specifically the 
metaphor — as a reconciliation between the thinking ego and the world. Exploring the 
paradoxical structure of Kafka’s text, the article illustrates finally how the paradoxes and 
aporias of a poetic text can lend themselves to a philosophical inquiry beyond the 
formulation of a preconceived and universal truth.   
 
2 Longing for presence: language and the metaphysical tradition 
of western thought 
 
According to Jacques Derrida, any deconstructionist reading of a text must begin by 
identifying “the fundamental conceptual oppositions they rely on: speech-writing, soul-
body, intelligible-sensible, literal-metaphorical, natural-cultural, masculine-
feminine…[his goal is to] subject these oppositions to an internal critique that 
destabilizes them” (HONDERICH 1995: 180). The binary opposition (Derrida refers to this 
idea as logocentrism) shows “the conceptual movement of thought which calms 
movement in favor of locating centers, origins, essences” (DERRIDA 1974: 274). It thus 
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refers to the idea of presence and works to the favor of the Western metaphysical 
tradition that privileges one side of the term over the other.  
 In the chapter Linguistics and Grammatolgy in Of Grammatology, Derrida 
criticizes Ferdinand de Saussure’s system of linguistics for having launched the binary 
sign without proceeding to erase it (DERRIDA 1974: 63). Derrida’s grammatology 
diagnoses in the oppositional structure of the sign a longing for presence that runs 
through the tradition of Western thought. In order to open up the reliability of language to 
rhetorical questioning, deconstruction acts as a “constant reminder of the ways in which 
language deflects or complicates the philosopher’s project” (Norris 1982: 19). Norris 
(1982: 19) writes:  
Above all, deconstruction works to undo the idea — according to Derrida, the ruling 
illusion of Western metaphysics — that reason can somehow dispense with language and 
arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or method.  
 
3 “Under erasure:” metaphor and the suspension of meaning  
 
Rather than a correspondence between thought and word, the collapse of the bridge in 
Kafka’s story illustrates how language is both inevitable and unreliable. Language is a 
differential network of meaning, which refuses the determination of a one-to-one link 
between signifier and signified (NORRIS 1982: 24). Influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
“continuous sign-chains,” without origin and end in “truth,” Derrida reads the entire 
notion of semiosis as a suspension of meaning, which constantly escapes the structure of 
presence (SPIVAK 1974: xliii). “The sign cannot be taken as a homogenous unit bridging 
an origin (referent) and an end (meaning), as ‘semiology,’ as the study of signs, would 
have it,” Spivak writes in regard to Derrida (SPIVAK 1974: xxxix).  
 The metaphor is the structure, in which presence is always marked through 
absence and the gesture represents the very thing it keeps absent. In this paradoxical 
double bind of presence and absence, the sign is always inhabited by another sign and 
must thus be read “under erasure” (DERRIDA 1974: 72). Instead of meaning, the reader is 
confronted with the indefinable deferring of meaning, which is only partly 
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comprehensible through its negativity, its absence, and the difference to what-it-is-not. In 
this way, Derrida introduces the term différance as the “structure that deconstructs 
structuralism” (SPIVAK 1974: lxi).  
Kafka’s “Brücke” and the violent and graphic death of its protagonist inscribe 
“writing under erasure” into the configurations of the text. Kafka’s bridge is the crossed 
out sign, which collapses the very moment it comes into use. The text dismantles any 
structure of binary oppositions as a mere comforting illusion of presence as it is 
conserved in the Saussurian sign (SPIVAK 1974: xl). Derrida’s grammatology shows no 
nostalgia for the lost presence that encapsulates the unity of word and thing and hence the 
loss of origin and end. In fact, he determines metaphor as the sign by “the trace or track 
of that other that is forever absent” (SPIVAK 1974: xviii). The trace is thus the mark of the 
absence of a presence, an always already absent presence. Derrida uses terms like 
différance and trace as “non-synonymous substitutions,” which operate in “a similar 
dislocating fashion to describe the unfolding of the functioning structure of a concept” 
(HONDERICH 1995: 268). In Writing and Difference, DERRIDA (1974: 403) clarifies the 
nature of the trace: 
The trace is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, 
displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for 
effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace. . . . In this way the metaphysical text 
is understood; it is still readable, and remains read.  
 
Kafka’s “Brücke” can thus be read as the metaphoric crossing out of the sign, leaving 
nothing but the traces of the torn bridge at the bottom of the abyss, replacing the 
Saussurian sign with the fragmented trace. 
 
4  A bridge to the world of appearances: Arendt’s thinking ego 
and the metaphor  
 
In a similar vain, the ‘life of the mind’ seems to occupy a dislocated, non-existing space 
in Arendt’s philosophy. Arendt argues that thinking always requires the withdrawal of the 
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thinking ego from the world of appearances. It is an invisible activity separated from all 
things. It takes place in solitude when the mind is secluded from the world around it. 
Through representing sensory objects and non-sensory matters, the mind transcends time 
and space, “To put it quite simply, in the proverbial absent-mindedness of the 
philosopher, everything present is absent because something actually absent is present to 
his mind…”(ARENDT 1971: 84).  
 Thinking it thus “always out of order, interrupts all ordinary activities and is 
interrupted by them” (ARENDT 1971: 197). However, the activity of thinking for Arendt 
never loses its connection with practice and the reality of the world we live in. Although 
all human beings are thinking beings, we are also grounded in the world of appearances. 
Taking up Plato’s story in the Theaetetus about the philosopher Thales who fell into a 
well while looking at the stars, provoking the laughter of a peasant girl from Thrace, 
Arendt believes that the philosopher’s own common sense must be alert enough to 
anticipate this laughter (ARENDT 1971: 83).  
 Thinking is only one of the many human faculties, and the “philosopher’s own 
common sense makes him aware of being ‘out of order’ while engaged in thinking” 
(ARENDT 1971: 80). In what ARENDT (1971: 83) describes as the “intramural warfare” 
between common-sense reasoning and speculative thinking, the thinking ego possesses 
both common sense reasoning and the faculty of thinking. ARENDT (1971: 81) points out 
that “all the metaphysical questions that philosophy took as its special topics arise out of 
the ordinary common-sense experiences.”  
 Arendt thus argues for the primacy of the world of appearances. While he or she 
abstracts and represents objects from the world of appearances through the faculty of 
imagination, the thinker withdraws from reality only to be called “back into the world of 
appearances” (ARENDT 1971: 185). Thinking and living accompany each other and the 
mind turns continuously towards life in its quest to understand its meaning. Thus, instead 
of dividing the world of appearances from the realm of thinking, Arendt links them 
together. As human beings, we have the urge not only to think and therefore withdraw 
from the world of appearances occasionally, but also to reconcile our thinking with 
reality through common sense. Eventually the thinking ego experiences the “urge to 
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speak and thus make manifest what otherwise would not be part of the appearing world at 
all” (ARENDT 1971: 98). 
  Since thinking deals with invisibles, we need metaphorical language as a tool to 
express our thoughts. However, language, by lending itself to metaphorical usage, 
enables us also to think, that is, to have traffic with non-sensory matters, because it 
permits a carrying-over of sense experiences (ARENDT 1971: 103). Thus, metaphorical 
language can be seen as the bridge that holds the two worlds together and closely binds 
the thinking ego to the world of appearances, “Analogies, metaphors, and emblems are 
the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has 
lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience” (Arendt 
1971: 109). 
  
5 The unity of human experience? — Kafka and the crisis of 
language  
 
It is precisely the alleged “unity of human experience” and its communicability that 
enables both thinking and speaking, that Kafka’s texts put into question. In the tradition 
of the language crisis, which “found such abundant expression in the 20th century” 
(Kovach 2002: 85), “Die Brücke” depicts a world, in which expression of thought into 
words and the transference of the life of the mind into the world of appearances through 
language becomes questionable. The text hence reflects the limits of language as a tool to 
express reality, and testifies in the tradition of writers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal 
(1874-1929) “to the problematic nature of the external world and the self” (KOVACH 
2002: 4).  
  For ARENDT (1989: 40), thinking gets bestowed with meaning and truth in the 
pluralistic act of judging: 
 Also, it is of course by no means true that you need or can even bear the company 
 of others when you happen to be busy thinking; yet, unless you can somehow 
 communicate and expose to the test of others, either orally or in writing, whatever you 
may have found out when you were alone, this faculty exerted in solitude will disappear. 
In the words of Jaspers, truth is what I can communicate.  
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Through communicating and thus testing my thoughts against the opinions of others, 
thinking attains a form of truth that it can never obtain in the solitary act of thinking 
itself. Just as our sense of reality and worldliness depends on the communicability of our 
thoughts, we can lose our faculty of thinking without communication and interaction with 
one another.  
 For Kafka and other thinkers and writers in the tradition of fin-de-siècle’s crisis of 
language, inner experiences cannot claim any value of ‘truth,’ not even for the individual. 
Influenced by Ernst Mach’s dictum (1838-1916) — “Das Ich ist unrettbar” — identity is 
understood only in the modus of irretrievable loss. The modern self is in crisis and with it 
its cognitive capabilities and possibilities to communicate with others. It is under these 
premises, as Ellen RITTER (2002: 77) writes, that “a distanced mode of expression 
arises,” “a language of mediacy.”  
Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s famous expression of the crisis in language in literary 
modernity, which he expresses quite articulately in Ein Brief, proves to be a prevalent 
question for writes and thinkers of the twentieth century and beyond. Thomas Kovach 
(2002: 94) writes:  
And finally, Chando’s crisis points to what was become a central preoccupation of the 
20
th
 century, reflected in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as in the more recent 
developments such as Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction: namely the demonstration that 
language can no longer be relied on as a valid signifier of a reality which exists outside 
itself, and in fact that we cannot ever experience a “reality” which is not already mediated 
by our language.  
 
While Arendt tries to rescue both the cognition of the individual and the common sense 
reality of a shared world through (metaphoric) language, Kafka’s text testifies to “the 
dilemma of a language that has lost its connection with reality” (KOVACH 2002: 91). 
Instead of presenting metaphor as “the greatest gift language could bestow on thinking” 
(ARENDT 1971: 105), Kafka’s text displays a radical openness in the image of the torn 
bridge at the end of the text. As Kafka writes in his diary (1948: 121): “Nur so kann 
geschrieben warden … mit solcher vollständigen Öffnung des Leibes und der Seele.” The 
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text thus embodies into its configurations the quest for meaning in the light of the self and 
its language, which is no longer reliable. RITTER (2002: 74) writes:  
 
 What constitutes the importance of the work in literary history, though, is the manner, in 
which the form is fully congruent with the content, indeed that the content is portrayed 
equally through the form of the narrative as through the action itself […].  
 
 
6 Sliding paradoxes and the poetics of truth 
 
The collapse of the bridge that causes its violent death (“zerrissen und aufgespiesst”) 
bears despite of its brutality a certain wit due to the paradoxical tension of its long 
anticipation of the wanderer and its failure upon his arrival. However, as WEITZMANN 
(2011: 592) points out, Kafka’s “paradox-mechanisms of wit” are fundamentally 
different from Kant’s, where these moments still act as a “Vehikel oder Hülle für die 
Vernunft und deren Handhabung für ihre moralisch-praktischen Ideen” (KANT 2002: 
131).  
 Far from containing a morality or aiming at the reader’s mere amusement, 
Kafka’s text calls into question the metaphysical assumptions of Western thought as the 
correspondence of mind and appearance as well as the transcending role language can 
play in it. WEITZMANN (2011: 594) concludes: “Kafka’s play with the play of paradox … 
will also be a means by which to reexamine of some of the most basic questions of 
philosophical inquiry.” Thus, the playfully aesthetic paradox discloses the rhetorical 
nature of philosophic arguments, which turns literature and with it the critic in a strong 
position to counter philosophy’s long held prejudices against poetic texts (NORRIS 1982: 
21).  
 It is precisely because of the acknowledgment and exploitation of the own 
rhetorical status that puts literature and literary theory in a privileged position over 
philosophical discourses. De MAN (1986: 13) writes: “Literature turns out to be the main 
topic of philosophy and the model of the kind of truth to which it aspires.”  
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Deconstruction as a critical theory questions the tradition of Western thought and 
“refuses to grant philosophy the kind of privileged status it has always claimed as the 
sovereign dispenser of reason” (NORRIS 1982: 18). Thus, a deconstructionist reading of 
Kafka’s text challenges Western philosophy’s belief in language as the binding element 
between thought and sensual experience. 
 The bridge’s anticipation of its own death at the beginning of the story — “So lag 
ich und wartete; ich musste warten. Ohne einzustürzen kann keine einmal errichtete 
Brücke aufhören, Brücke zu sein” — must be read as an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of self-presence and origin. DERRIDA (1974: 61) writes: 
 
The value of the transcendental arche [origin] must make its necessity felt before letting 
itself be erased. The concept of the arche-trace must comply with that necessity and that 
erasure. It is in fact contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity. 
 
Kafka playfully alludes to this necessity by varying its structure to the “almost necessity.” 
As WEITZMANN (2011: 592) points out, the “almost necessary” occurs frequently in 
Kafka’s work and “constantly provides the criteria for situations and actions that are just 
as lamentable as they are amusing and as amusing as they are lamentable.” She continues 
(2011: 592): “Seeming inevitability and logical circularity not only provides a certain 
comic tension, but furnishes the whole inner impetus and mechanism of the plot at large.” 
The “almost necessary” structure is settled between the superfluous and the necessary, 
and is thus more than the paradoxical reversal of expected logic. It cannot be “re-
reversed” into its “original truth” and remains a “permanent paradox” that cannot be 
dissolved (WEITZMANN 2011: 594). Kafka’s text hence testifies to the aporetic structure 
of reason itself, while at the same time resurrects ‘truth’ by locating the collapse of the 
bridge within the realm of the ‘almost necessary.’ The fact that the bridge becomes a 
bridge only through and by collapsing — “Ohne einzustürzen kann keine einmal 
errichtete Brücke aufhören, Brücke zu sein” — which at the same time determines the 
end of its life and functionality, is indeed a brilliant display of Kafka’s mechanisms of 
paradoxical wit.  
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 Kafka’s sliding paradoxes, NEUMANN (1968: 706) writes, “lenken nicht auf eine 
Synthese des Widersprüchlichen hin, wie das traditionelle Paradox, sondern von jeder 
erwarteten Stimmigkeit ab; jede Auflösung ist bloß eine Reduktion auf neuerlich und viel 
ursprünglich Unbegreifliches.”  “Die Brücke” therefore embodies an aporia that 
constantly escapes its determination to an unequivocal meaning. Aporia, Terry 
EAGLETON (2003: 275) points out, “is the impass of meaning, where texts get into 
trouble, come unstuck, offer to contradict themselves.”  
 
7. Kafka’s bridge — a hybrid dislocated in the alienation of 
modernity 
 
The controversial and thus aporetic structure is already embodied in the ambivalent 
characteristics of Kafka’s bridge and its narrative style. As the narrating I, the bridge also 
refers to itself in the third person, questioning the boundaries of subject and object. At the 
same time, the bridge inhabits human traits — its anthropomorphic embodiment includes 
hands, feet, and hair — and was yet erected to fulfill the mere role of transporting the 
traveler from one side of the abyss to the other. The hybrid nature of the bridge 
inaugurates the paradoxical disposition of the text into its very own structure. The bridge 
is a thinking entity that is fully endowed with the capacities of thought and the faculty to 
feel pain. In a gesture that appears to be fully human, it aspires to fulfill its entrusted role 
as a tool of transportation. KAFKA (1969: 327) writes: 
 
Strecke dich, Brücke, setze dich in Stand, geländerloser Balken, halte den dir 
Anvertrauten. Die Unsicherheit seines Schrittes gleiche unmerklich aus, schwankt er aber, 
dann gib dich zu erkennen und wie ein Berggott schleudere ihn ans Land.  
 
The paradoxical nature of the bridge combines human traits and even traces of 
megalomania, and its confinement to the mere status as an object of traffic, creates a 
comical relief to the inherent violence of the plot. However, the moment the bridge turns 
around to look at his tormentor, the story shifts into the fatedness of tragedy. Thus, 
Kafka’s bridge finds itself falling into the depth of the abyss while desperately crying out, 
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“Brücke dreht sich um” (1969: 327). Kafka’s bridge struggles with a quest for meaning 
that eludes the grasp of a self-present awareness. Identity is marked through self-
differentiation and self-postponement, which dismantles subjectivity as a transcendental 
term. Kafka’s “Brücke” thus deconstructs language in terms of a trace-structure, effacing 
it even as it presents its legibility (SPIVAK 1974: xviii).  
Contrary to Arendt’s idealistic view on language as a bridge that unifies the world 
of appearances and the world of thought, and enables one to feel at home in both, Kafka’s 
“Brücke” experiences the dislocation and estrangement of modernity. “The crucial 
importance of Kafka for twentieth-century thought,” Miller (1991: 23) writes, “lies not 
only in his extreme experience of the loss of self-hood, but also in his deep exploration of 
the tangled relationships of writing and salvation.” Kafka’s diaries are full of descriptions 
of his inner emptiness resulting from the disastrous withdrawal into one’s own center. 
Our time is marked by a broken link between a subject and his or her object, be it the self, 
God, or the fellow human being. The fact that the other can only be experienced through 
his or her absence can be seen in the revealed identity of the wanderer of Kafka’s 
“Brücke:” “Wer war es? Ein Kind? Ein Traum? Ein Wegelagerer? Ein Selbstmörder? Ein 
Versucher? Ein Vernichter?” (KAFKA 1969: 327).  
Thus, the collapse of the bridge and its struggle to hold on to both sides of the 
abyss reflects the experience of the self in modernity, which denies a meaningful 
existence within the community of other people. This isolation of the individual can be 
seen in Kafka’s text through the fact that the bridge is situated in an impassable height 
that no one has ever strayed to and that is not traced on any map: “Kein Tourist verirrte 
sich zu dieser unwegsamen Höhe, die Brücke war in den Karten noch nicht 
eingezeichnet” (KAFKA 1969: 327). A crumbling and dissolving ground, onto which the 
bridge firmly holds, marks both sides of the abyss. KAFKA (1969: 327) writes:  
 
Diesseits waren die Fußspitzen, jenseits die Hände eingebohrt, in bröckelnden Lehm habe 
ich mich festgebissen. Die Schöße meines Rockes wehten zu meinen Seiten. In der Tiefe 
lärmte der eisige Forellenbach. …  
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In their mysterious images, descriptions, and actions, Kafka’s poetic texts are figural 
embodiments of his inner life and his situation in the world as a state of alienation. They 
reflect what it means to be “outside of everything, even outside of oneself” (MILLER 19).  
“It is as if I were made of stone,” KAFKA (1948: 27) writes in his diary, “I have become 
cold again, and insensible.” This experience is reflected in the bridge’s self-description; 
“Ich war steif und kalt, ich war eine Brücke, über einen Abgrund lag ich” (KAFKA 1969: 
327). Once the metaphysical link between the thinking ego and the outside world is 
broken, the individual is lost in the eternal circularity of its own thoughts: “Einmal gegen 
Abend war es — der erste, war es der tausendste, ich weiss es nicht, — meine Gedanken 
gingen immer in einem Wirrwarr und immer in der Runde” (KAFKA 1969: 327). 
  
8 Writing: “outside the self — in itself ”   
 
Writing, it may seem, is the one action which, depending on nothing outside the self, and 
deriving from a voluntary and autonomous exercise of the power to transform things into 
words, can stop the fall into the abyss (MILLER 1991: 23). Striving for a comfort in 
writing, KAFKA (1948: 212) arrogates to himself the almost divine powers of someone 
who obtains a “higher type of observation.” This is reflected in the bridge’s emphatic 
attitude with which it will carry out the transport of the traveler “wie ein Berggott” 
(KAFKA 1969: 327).   
However, Kafka’s relation to writing remains within the aporetic structure of a 
yearning for connection with the world and its fellow men. MILLER (1991: 24) writes: 
“Far from being able to escape out of his own inner emptiness into the solidity and 
coherence of a story, Kafka is repulsed by the broken fragments of incomplete ones, and 
kept outside of the void, hanging on, as it were, with both hands. Kafka finally recognizes 
that the attempt to reach out and connect through literature is impossible, because “the 
space of literature is, par excellence, the place of separation” (MILLER 1991: 27).  
 In his diary, KAFKA (1948: 77) writes: 
What will be my fate as a writer is very simple.  … I waver, continually fly to the summit 
of the mountain, but then fall back in a moment. Others waver too, but in lower regions, 
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with greater strength; if they are in the danger of falling, they are caught up by the 
kinsman who walks beside them for that very purpose. But I waver on the heights; it is 
not death, alas, but the eternal torments of dying. 
  
In this context, Kafka’s text deconstructs itself by pointing towards its own aporia that 
renders writing futile. However, it is precisely in the absence of specifications, as Miller 
(1991: 295) points out, “multiplies the poems’ powers over the reader to a hundredfold.” 
Through the “significance of the missing names” — which appears in Kafka’s text as a 
performative aspect, leaving the answers concerning the identity of the traveler 
unanswered — that creates the power of the poetic text to “haunt their readers, to stick in 
the mind and lodge there permanently, as an ache or throb the reader can never 
outgrow…” (MILLER 1991: 295).  
 Deconstruction contrasts the nostalgia for the lost presence with the Nietzsche’s 
affirmative joy, which is reflected in the paradoxical wit of Kafka’s poetic texts. In this 
respect, Nietzsche appears as a forerunner of Derrida and de Man who insist on the 
ambivalent and aporetic character of philosophical, linguistic, and literary problems 
(Zima 1999: 150). Derrida (1974: 272) interprets the metaphor as an “outside the self — 
in itself.” It thus bears the possibility to restore meaning to a text stripped off of its 
metaphysical reading. On the ambivalent structure of origin and trace, DERRIDA (1974: 
161) writes: 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin, … it means that the origin did not even 
disappear, that is never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which 
thus becomes the origin of the origin. 
 
In the image of the scattered bridge at the end of the story, the text points toward its own 
openness and encapsulates a performative aspect. It calls out for the reader to collect the 
broken pieces and transform them into meaning. It this way, the traces of the bridge bear 
within themselves the presence and the loss of an origin that can be put together 
reciprocally and becomes the origin of the origin as the bridge reappears in its own title 
of “Die Brücke.” DERRIDA (1987: 427) writes: 
 
Turned towards the presence, lost or impossible, of the absent origin, the structuralist 
thematic of broken immediateness is thus the sad, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauist 
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aspect of the thought of play which the Nietzschean affirmation — the joyous affirmation 
of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of 
signs without fault, without truth, without origin, offered to an active interpretation — 
would be the other side. 
 
Kafka’s “Brücke” presents us with both — the nostalgia for a lost presence captured in 
the bridge, who is desperately holding on to both sides of the abyss, and the joyous 
affirmation of a world stripped of its apodeictic meaning represented in the wanderer and 
its playful will to destruct the bridge. Through its aporetic structure, evoked through the 
metaphorical imagery of the bridge and its remaining traces, “Die Brücke” evokes a 
performative power that creates its recipient in the act of writing. “Writing is a 
dislocation in the sense that it moves the soul itself of the writer, as well as of the 
recipient, beyond or outside of itself, over there, somewhere else” (MILLER 1991: 289).  
 It is in this context that we can and must reconsider the question of literature and 
philosophy and their relationship to each other. As Derrida (1987: 147) in his reading on 
Kafka’s story “Vor dem Gesetz” points out, there is a place “for all literature to exceed 
literature.” In fact, it is the very nature of literature to go over and beyond itself, to the 
point where literature would no longer be literature if it were ‘only’ literature. Just as 
Kafka’s bridge would stop being a bridge if it were not for its ultimate collapse, the text 
belongs to and is ‘literature’ as it shows the very breakdown of a logocentric discourse 
and its underlying binary structures, as well as the role of literature within its 
deconstruction, which no longer authorizes us to make such a judgment.   
 
9 Conclusion  
 
Kafka’s “Brücke” deconstructs the idea of an alleged rescue that links the metaphysical 
realm with the world of experiences. The text refuses to provide a transfer for the 
thinking ego, and violently crosses out the possibility of “carrying over” and thus 
connecting with our fellow men. John CAPUTO (1997: 271) writes: 
The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things — texts, 
institutions, traditions, [etc.] …  — do not have definable meanings and determinable 
missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the 
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boundaries they currently occupy … A ‘meaning’ or a ‘mission’ is a way to contain and 
compact things, like a nutshell…the very idea is to crack it open and disturb its tranquility 
… cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is.  
 
The power of Kafka’s texts lies in their figurative language through which they remain 
open for the quest of meaning. The openness of what Derrida calls ‘the trace’ cannot be 
represented by a theoretical text, but needs to be embodied into the configurations of a 
poetic text. The isolation of alienation and the crisis of language the modern self 
experiences is encapsulated in Kafka’s “Brücke,” which testifies to the only way writing 
becomes possible. For the Kafkan protagonist, dislocated from his or her origin and faced 
with the threat of meaninglessness in a world that has lost its metaphysical belief, this 
openness can only be a painful experience, marked by the violence of the “cracking 
open.” Rather than ARENDT’S (1989: 40) belief in truth as something “I can 
communicate,” Kafka shares his fate with the protagonists in his stories. He remains true 
to the endless wavering, until — paradoxically, as MILLER (1991: 30) points out — “his 
work became the falsehood which testifies to the truth, the wavering which reveals the 
goal even though the goal is never reached.”  
 The question as to whether or not ‘the goal is reached’ in Kafka’s “Brücke” 
remains to be determined by the reader and his or her imagination. After all, we do only 
know the tragic fate of the bridge — fulfilling its destiny by devastatingly failing it — but 
we will never know whether or not the wanderer will make it to the other side of the 
abyss. Arendt’s observation — we do not know where the thinker goes when engaged in 
the absent-minded act of thinking — is perhaps even more accurate for the reader. But 
Kafka’s text certainly calls us back into the world of appearances — a world we 
ultimately share and all can relate to in its paradoxical loss of meaning.  
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